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Summary  
What does closing civic space mean for development? Aid donors are concerned about the 
implications of restrictions on civil society for their partners and programmes, but to date 
there has been little clarity about what this means for development. This paper summarises 
the findings of a literature review in support of research on this issue. It concludes that: 
(a) civic space has changed more than shrunk, although new restrictions affect aid-
supported groups disproportionately; (b) new regulations are not all unwelcome, but 
nonetheless shift power from civic to political actors; (c) how that power shift shapes 
development outcomes depends on how political elites deploy that power, and in whose 
interests; (d) while there are instances where civil society has been curtailed to advance 
‘developmentalist’ agendas, it more often enables land and natural resource grabbing, or the 
abuse of labour or other rights of marginalised and disempowered groups; (e) while short-
term economic growth is unlikely to be adversely affected, economic crises are more likely in 
settings where civic space is closed, and it is highly improbable that development has any 
chance of producing equitable, sustainable, or inclusive outcomes under conditions where 
civic space is restricted or closing.  
 
Keywords: civil society; closing civic space; democracy; human rights; NGOs; political economy 
of development. 
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Executive summary 
This paper summarises the findings of a review of the literature relevant to assessing the 
implications of shrinking civic space for development. A wave of closures of civic space has 
occurred around the world, notably in the last decade, but not all civil society actors are 
equally affected: the objects of new restrictions are typically groups and organisations from a 
liberal and human rights tradition, often aid-funded and with strong transnational links, as 
well as their allies in social movements, the media and academia. Developing countries may 
have long established traditions of civil society, but formal organisations in the specifically 
liberal tradition proliferated after the end of the Cold War, with aid financing increasing 
rapidly during the 1990s and 2000s, particularly to service-providing actors. The recent 
(gathering pace in the past five years, but in fact dating back to the War on Terror) wave of 
restrictions on civic space must be situated in the similarly relatively recent growth of such 
organisations in most developing countries.  
 
Not all new regulations on civil society are unwelcome, even by civil society actors; without 
effective regulation, the rapid earlier expansion enabled inefficiencies and abuses. In 
principle, new regulations purport to strengthen the governance and accountability of civil 
society, and to assert national sovereignty over the development process. In practice, 
however, efforts to regulate civic space are often a heavy-handed mixture of stigmatisation 
and delegitimisation, selective application of rules and restrictions, and violence and 
impunity for violence against civic actors and groups, motivated by the concentration or 
consolidation of political power. 
 
Civic space may be conceptualised not as closing or shrinking overall, but as changing, in 
terms of who participates and on what terms. The rapid growth of the digital public sphere 
has dramatically reshaped the civic space for all actors, while right wing, extremist, and neo-
traditionalist groups and urban protest movements have occupied demonstrably more of the 
civic space in the past decade. That civic space may be seen as changing rather than 
shrinking also fits with the observation that many civil society actors report being pushed or 
pulled into closer relationships with political elites or the state, in order to continue to 
operate.  
 
How might efforts to restrict particular types of civil society actors within the changing civic 
space impact on development? There is no easy or single answer. Much depends upon how 
the political power these restrictions seek to concentrate or consolidate is deployed in, or 
against, the pursuit of developmental goals, as well as on how those goals are set. Closures 
of democratic and human rights-based civic space will mean countries fail on the SDG 16 
indicators of ‘peace, justice, and strong institutions’. Yet what we know of the impacts of civil 
society on development in the past suggests that ‘core’ human development indicators are 
highly likely to be affected, as civic actors have influenced policies and practice on poverty, 
hunger, gender equality, livelihoods, health and education, across a wide range of contexts, 
but in particular for marginalised and disempowered groups. Broadly defined, civil society 
has strengthened the accountability of the development process, in documented instances 
contributing to fairer or better laws or public services, control of corruption, and acting as a 
check or spur on fiscal and macroeconomic policy.  
 
Yet while in many developing countries, civic and political rights have been exercised to 
support the realisation of basic human needs, some countries noted for their high growth 
and rapid human development appear to have achieved such gains without the benefits of 
generous civic space. At the same time, countries with well-established civil society 
institutions and formally democratic public space are frequently unable to overcome powerful 
opposition to distributive policies through open or democratic processes. These paradoxes 
draw attention to the conditions under which civil society contributes to inclusive 
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development processes. These are present when actors have the capacity to represent the 
concerns of the marginalised and disempowered, with both the space to articulate those 
concerns independently, and the traction with political elites to elicit a policy response 
through meaningful engagement. It helps to understand civil society not only as groups 
advocating from beyond the boundaries of organised politics, but also as a site of contention, 
of constant struggle over the interests of state, society, and the market, spilling over at times 
into political and economic concerns. It is not only the independence of civil society, but the 
nature of its ‘fit’ with the state, that best explains the politics of inclusive development.  
 
That efforts to restrict civic space seek to curb this contention, typically to clear a path for 
state or political projects or for business deals, is clear. Some of the most violent and 
sustained recent attacks on civil society actors have clustered around potentially lucrative 
land and natural resource deals, and around labour rights, particularly in export sectors; 
indigenous people’s and human rights groups, peasant and labour organisations have 
struggled against deals deemed harmful to society or the environment. These efforts to 
restrict civil society actors are self-evidently efforts by state and political actors to 
concentrate and consolidate their own power, sometimes in alliance with powerful business 
actors. An assertion of sovereignty and nationalist or traditional values tends to accompany 
and inform these moves, alongside concerted ideological efforts to discredit or delegitimise 
specific actors.  
 
Recognising that closures of civic space are part of wider power struggles draws attention to 
how the distribution and balance of political power – or political settlement - shapes the 
inclusiveness of development in any particular country. Political settlements shape 
development through the stability of institutional arrangements, which establish the political 
space in which ruling elites can pursue politically unpopular or difficult policies. Whether 
elites do so for predatory or developmental purposes in turn depends on the nature of ruling 
coalitions, which shape commitment and capacity to deliver inclusive development, and the 
incentives for redistributive policies and programmes.  
 
With these understandings of the relationship between civic space and development in mind, 
the conceptual part of the paper sets out some preliminary propositions about how closing 
civic space is likely to play out in particular political economic and development settings. It 
distinguishes between those in which political power is exercised by more and less dominant 
actors, and between policy regimes that range between predatory or extractive on the one 
hand, and ‘developmental’ or broadly inclusive, on the other. It also highlights policy domains 
in which closing civic space is most likely to be affected in different settings, to help develop 
a methodological approach to empirical analysis.  
 
The paper concludes by briefly summarising some of the findings from further country-level 
analysis which attempted to test and refine these propositions, and suggesting areas for 
further research. These include the significance of the growing role of China as a 
development partner in the normative and policy environment, and the associated 
implications for the role of Western aid in more liberal democratic traditions. It is clear that 
civic space is under pressure not only in authoritarian regimes, but in settings where 
significant power shifts are underway, both to and from more dominant arrangements of 
power. In countries where dominant political authorities are predatory in nature, 
humanitarian and economic crises are among the most important developmental impacts of 
restricted civic space, and human rights activists are under particular pressure. Countries 
with established civic and political institutions or where democratisation is underway indicate 
a tendency to draw civil society actors closer into the fold of political power, ensuring 
progressive actors more traction, but leading also to an at times suffocatingly close 
relationship with the state or political actors that prevents independent critique or dissent. 
Even established democracies can see civic space squeezed by powerful alliances between 
political and economic actors, particularly in the case of land and natural resource deals.  
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In so-called ‘developmental’ states, closing civic space is particularly likely to impact on aid 
dependent low-income countries through a loss of aid funding to NGO service providers. The 
‘watchdog’ role of civil society in such contexts remains important however, particularly in 
relation to the credibility of official development performance data, which is an important 
source of legitimacy for political elites in such contexts. 
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1 Introduction 
This paper reviews the literature on the relationship between civic space and development, 
with the specific aim of identifying mechanisms through which restrictions on civil society 
may impact on the development process in particular country contexts. The review was 
undertaken in support of a larger effort to assess and respond to those impacts in support of 
the goals of sustainable, equitable and inclusive development. It aims to provide foundations 
for a robust conceptual framework and empirical analysis of the relationship between civic 
space and development, and specifically to help identify the risks narrowing space for civil 
society actors may entail for the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
in particular social and political settings, and strategies for addressing those. 
 
There has been much recent discussion about how, in the past 10 to 20 years, governments 
across the world have introduced policies, laws and more informal practices restricting the 
scope of activity of civil society, including the media and human rights defenders as well as 
NGOs and social movements such as land rights defenders, women’s and peasant 
movements, labour organisations, and environmental activists, and in particular actors and 
organisations receiving foreign funding. Strategies have included legal, political, 
administrative, as well as extra-legal strategies such as violence and threats, and domination 
of public space to de-legitimate and stigmatise civil society actors for a range of reasons 
(Carothers and Brechenmacher 2014; Dupuy, Ron, and Prakash 2016; Howell and Lind 
2010; Hayman et al. 2014; Rutzen 2015; KIOS Foundation 2015; ICNL 2016a). These efforts 
plainly aim to preserve, consolidate or increase the power of state or political society 
(Mendelson 2015b; Hayman 2016; Poppe and Wolff 2017), pushing back against a real or 
perceived expansion of civil society power (Mathews 1997). Violent and ideological attacks 
on civil society actors have become more common, sometimes with impunity and/or official 
protection (CIVICUS 2015, 2016b, 2016a). These efforts at closure have affected many 
forms of civil society, including democracy promotion, human rights defenders, national and 
international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society organisations 
(CSOs), social movements and mass protests, organised labour, professional groups such 
as lawyers and academics, as well as social and mass media. 
 
Civic space closures directly reflect weakening protections of civil and political rights, and so 
are likely to shape broader processes of sustainable economic, social and human 
development. The 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda Resolution adopted by the UN 
General Assembly in 2015 notes the role of civil society in establishing priorities and goals: a 
partnership ‘will facilitate an intensive global engagement in support of implementation of all 
the Goals and targets, bringing together Governments, the private sector, civil society, the 
United Nations system and other actors and mobilizing all available resources’ (UN 2015: 
10). Aid coordination mechanisms, including the High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 
Busan (ACT Alliance and CIDSE 2014) and the report by the High-Level Panel of Eminent 
Persons on the post-2015 sustainable development agenda similarly note a prominent role 
for civil society in the achievements of the MDGs, and for deliberating over, delivering, and 
monitoring the SDGs (HLPE 2013).  
 
More recently, the 2017 High-Level Meeting of the Partnership for Effective Development 
Co-operation concluded that effective monitoring of development progress depended on 
increasing ‘the number and quality of partnerships with businesses, civil society, 
philanthropies, parliaments, subnational governments and trade unions to achieve 
development goals’, as well as establishing ‘inclusive mechanisms for dialogue and 
engagement with civil society organisations, with clear goals, mandates and expected 
results’. The Forum concluded that governments should ‘improve the policy, legal and 
regulatory environment so civil society and business can maximize their contribution to 
development’, while development partners should support the capacity of governments to 
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establish and carry out multi-stakeholder partnerships (Global Partnership for Effective 
Development Co-operation 2017: 37). With such hopes for civil society, it is important that it 
is able to flourish, yet the evidence seems to indicate that its space for doing so is 
increasingly being restricted. 
 
Efforts are increasingly being made to improve the monitoring of civic space, and to make 
sense of its effects. The CIVICUS Monitor tracking changes in civic space focuses on 
freedoms of expression, association and peaceful assembly (CIVICUS 2016a). These are 
included among the targets for SDG 16, which aims to ‘promote peaceful and inclusive 
societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, 
accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels’. Targets 16.7 (‘ensure responsive, 
inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels’) and 16.10 (‘ensure 
public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national 
legislation and international agreements’) are useful targets of civic space that imply an 
active role for different actors within civil society. The adoption of the SDG16 goal was 
contentious, and several countries were resistant to the imposition of liberal democracy 
goals within the SDG framework; it may therefore not be a strategic focus of attention with 
respect to analysing and reporting on the implications of shrinking civic space for 
development. In addition, some observers consider the indicators and targets themselves to 
be weak and difficult to monitor. However, supplemental indicators for SDG 16 have been 
developed in ways that draw closer attention to particular groups whom civic space 
constrictions may put at greatest risk of being left behind by development. These include 
urban youth, women’s rights groups, indigenous and minority groups, social movements and 
land and labour rights movements (Nygård 2017).  
 
Even if SDG 16 is contentious, it is widely acknowledged that civic space, or ‘the freedom 
and means to speak, access information, associate, organise, and participate in public 
decision-making - is essential to the healthy functioning and development of any society’, 
and ‘an essential precondition for human rights, social justice and accountable governance’ 
(Malena 2015: 11). The UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful 
assembly and association underlined that these were not indivisible from other human rights, 
but ‘fundamental rights that form the basis of the full enjoyment of other rights, as they 
enable the exercise of a number of civil, political, economic, cultural and social rights’ 
(OHCHR 2017a: 5). In practice, constrictions on civic space and its defenders’ sphere of 
action are widely expected to have impacts on poverty reduction, inequality, human security 
and basic protections, as well as on marginalisation and conflict; by contrast, more open 
societies tend to be safer, more inclusive, and more peaceful in how they resolve conflicts 
and distribute resources (Malena 2015).  
 
An important counter-point to the presumption that civic space constrictions impact 
adversely on development are arguments about the relationship between state capacity, the 
concentration of political power, and development outcomes, particularly the achievement of 
broad-based economic growth and social provisioning (human development and social 
protection). These point to evidence of development achievements in highly closed states, in 
particular, in recent years, Ethiopia and Rwanda, but also of course to the best example of 
growth and economic development without democracy, China. One argument is that 
shrinking civic space may not in and of itself be adverse for development, particularly where 
state capacity and authority are weak or fragmented and growth is slow and uneven. 
‘Developmental states’, states which drive through structural transformations that engender 
growth and human development have historically emerged in settings where dominant 
parties controlled power, often political systems in which civil society was comparatively 
weak (White 1994).  
 
Silencing critics and repressing dissent can in theory afford ruling elites the long-time 
horizons to introduce unpopular policies that may enable rapid economic and social 
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transformations that may otherwise be politically difficult to introduce. In practice, however, 
regimes where political power is highly centralised can be predatory as well as 
‘developmental’. Even under otherwise ‘developmental state’ systems, marginalised and 
excluded groups are likely to suffer from a lack of representation from civil society or 
competitive politics; economic investments may be undertaken without consideration of 
indigenous and other land and resource rights; and grand corruption is likely to thrive under 
conditions of secrecy and a cowed press or anti-corruption campaigners. Economic ‘take-off’ 
has not been associated with good governance in all instances, but the evidence is clear that 
sustaining growth over time depends on the establishment of laws and regulations, and on 
pathways to inclusive or shared development (Hickey, Sen and Bukenya 2015). These may 
require a more competitive polity and policy process, involving civil society actors among 
others. An effort to unpack the impacts on development of shrinking civil society space must 
thus pay close attention to the meaning and quality (inclusiveness, equality, sustainability) of 
‘development’, rather than assuming economic growth is a sufficient proxy. This is 
particularly important if we are to make sense of potential impacts on the SDGs, with their 
strong emphasis on equality, inclusion, and human development, and on leaving no one 
behind. 
 
To explore these issues in a systematic way, literature was gathered and reviewed from 
across a range of types of organisation and source, including over 1,000 items from journal 
articles, book chapters, official, aid and multilateral agency and civil society reports, and 
newspaper and other media articles. Literatures reviewed included the following: 
 
 recent studies and reports on the phenomenon of closing civic space, chiefly by 
international thinktanks and watchdog groups such as Freedom House or CIVICUS; 
 scholarly and organisational literature on the contributions of civil society to 
development; 
 scholarly literature on the relationship between political settlements, the nature and 
evolution of civil society, and development outcomes in selected countries; 
 official reports and data and analysis of development progress;  
 media coverage of recent events such as political leaders being jailed or ousted, etc. 
or new regulations on NGO or civil society action. 
 
The literature review informed methodological considerations in the design of country case 
studies through which the authors have explored the implications of closing civic space for 
development in different settings in greater detail. The findings of those case studies will be 
published separately in this IDS Working Paper series, as will a separate methodological 
reflection on the challenges of assessing and measuring the impacts of closing civic space 
on development outcomes. 
 
The present paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews literature on the scale, nature 
and causes of shrinking civic space. Section 3 reviews relevant conceptual and theoretical 
debates on civil society and the politics of inclusive development. Section 4 draws on desk-
based studies of 13 countries to explore propositions about the mechanisms through which 
civic space closures may impact on development within particular country contexts. 
Section 5 concludes, with a discussion of the methodological challenges of empirical 
research on the impacts of closing civic space on development. 
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2  The nature and form of closing civic space 
in the early twenty-first century 
2.1 A global trend of closing civic space? 
After the end of the Cold War, there were two decades in which civil society organisations 
emerged and grew around the world. Since then, the space in which parts of civil society is 
able to operate without fear of incurring official disapproval, hostility, violence, abuse, or of 
breaking laws or regulations, has been shrinking across the world, in particular in the last 
few years (Carothers and Brechenmacher 2014; Mendelson 2015b; ICNL 2016b). Civil 
society monitoring identified over 100 countries in which civic freedoms were curtailed in 
2016; 3.2 billion people are now estimated to live in countries where civic space is closed or 
controlled (CIVICUS 2016b, 2016a). An initial wave came in the early 2000s, when the so-
called ‘War on Terror’ curbed the expansionary trend of the 1990s, introducing restrictions on 
financing to civil society organisations and on other civic and political freedoms, in both 
developed and developing countries (Howell and Lind 2010; Howell et al. 2008; Lind and 
Howell 2010; Bloodgood and Tremblay-Boire 2011; Hayes 2013, 2012). A second wave 
followed the expansion of the global public space with the internet, with the Wikileaks 
phenomenon inducing political crises and sharp reactions by powerful and other states. The 
rise of the so-called ‘Islamic State’ prompted a further round of restrictions on freedom of 
speech and association, in particular in Europe and the United States, and of abrogations of 
international human rights standards regarding refugees and displaced persons.  
 
Discussion of the wave of closing civic (or civil society) space1 has to date been 
concentrated among activists, thinktanks, policy research groups and networks from within 
civil society, and discussions generally take place within an international human rights 
framework. These are often led by groups with international presence and stature, such as 
the international civil society alliance CIVICUS, the International Center for Not-for-Profit 
Law, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, or the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS). The scope for assessing or measuring changes in civic space 
has been explored (Biekart 2008; Malena 2015), and tracking initiatives established. The 
CIVICUS monitoring ratings combine real-time qualitative and quantitative indicators to 
categorise countries as having open, narrowed, obstructed, repressed, or closed civic 
space.2 The most recent Monitor detected a worsening trend, including in Europe (Gaebee 
2017).  
 
A body of organisational reports in the past half-decade has identified the closure of civic 
space as a concern for global public policy. In his final report, the former United Nations 
Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association, 
Maina Kiai, set out the problem as one of powerful actors destroying socially-necessary 
institutions for easy short-term wins: 
 
The trend of shrinking civic space – laws and practices that restrict civil society’s ability 
to operate – is threatening to take the air from civil society’s lungs. This is unfortunate 
because it is both self-destructive and short-sighted, even for those orchestrating the 
closure. Repression today may help a government silence a critic tomorrow, or boost a 
                                                 
1  This paper uses ‘civic space’ and ‘civil society space’ interchangeably. However, it makes it clear that it takes a broad 
view of actors within the civic space, recognising that many are unlike the customarily liberal, human rights-based 
model of civil society promoted by international aid. 
2  For more information, see https://monitor.civicus.org/ (accessed 17 October 2017). 
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business’ profits the next day. But at what cost next month, next year and for the next 
generation?  
(Kiai 2017a: 21) 
 
Kiai’s successor, Annalisa Ciampi, noted in her 2017 vision statement: 
 
the voices of civil society have been restricted or silenced, if not eliminated, in every 
region across the globe. Mass surveillance, obstructive regulation of democratic 
space, including online, overly restrictive legislation to regulate association and limit 
the exercise of fundamental public freedoms, with frequent use of counter -terrorism 
legislation to curtail dissenting voices, and harassment of and violence against human 
rights defenders and ordinary people who exercise their right to express opinions in 
peaceful protests are all too common.  
(OHCHR 2017a: 6) 
 
Also in 2017, the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders, Michel 
Forst, reported to the UN General Assembly that he was ‘more appalled than ever to see 
attacks against them multiplying everywhere, assailing bloggers, indigenous peoples, 
journalists, community leaders, whistle-blowers and community volunteers’, and that he had 
‘become convinced that the incidents in question are not isolated acts but concerted attacks 
against those who try to embody the ideal of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in a 
world free from fear and want’ (OHCHR 2017b: 3). The Special Rapporteur on the Promotion 
and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression noted that in 2017, the 
‘crisis for freedom of expression has deepened worldwide’ (OHCHR 2017c).   
 
Recent reports highlight the challenge of responding to shrinking civic space, including 
strategies for civil society actors and for donors (Carothers 2015; USIP 2017a; ICNL 2016b; 
ACT Alliance/CIDSE et al. 2015; Ariadne no date). A prominent series of blogs in the 
‘Shrinking Space for Civil Society’ collection for Open Democracy explored the implications 
of efforts to police cyberspace (Hellema 2017; see also Deibert 2015); the challenge for 
donors and governments in protecting civic space (Kiai 2017b); the impacts of the 
securitisation of civic space on public safety (Dobichina and Joshi 2016); and the importance 
of ‘citizen solidarity and the resilient rule of law’ in defending civic space (Brysk 2017).  
 
Overall, however, it is less the size or freedom than the shape and nature of participation in 
civic space which has changed in recent years.3 The space for formal civil society 
organisations, in particular human rights defenders, social movements and struggles of 
marginalised and disempowered groups such as women, racialised or ethnic minorities, and 
indigenous populations, NGOs, and the independent media, has been restricted in recent 
years. At the same time, civic space has arguably widened for some groups, including 
conservatives and the far right in Europe, North and South America, and Asia. A wave of 
spontaneous protests over austerity, economic crisis, corruption and authoritarianism has 
also occupied part of the civic space in the past decade, and the expansion of virtual or 
digital public space is also a feature of the recent past. Civic space is changing, even while it 
is closing for democratic and human rights-based groups. 
 
2.2 Instruments of shrinking space 
Means adopted to close or restrict civic space range from interventions using the formal 
legal system through to the use of violence and intimidation with impunity by non-state 
actors. Van der Borgh and Terwindt identify the following as actions and policies that are 
variously used to restrict NGO operational space: i) physical harassment and intimidation, 
including threats, injuries and killings, impunity and lack of protection; ii) criminalisation: 
                                                 
3  Many thanks to Peter Houtzager for this point. 
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prosecution and investigation, preventative measures such as terrorism lists and terrorism 
taskforces, investigation and prosecution for punitive purposes; iii) administrative restrictions 
such as restrictive bills on NGO registration and operation, and ad hoc measures by different 
governments; iv) stigmatisation and negative labelling, including criminal and social 
stigmatisation of specific actors; and v) ‘space under pressure’, including through co-optation 
and the closure of newly created space (Van der Borgh and Terwindt 2012; see also ACT 
Alliance 2011). Looking specifically at the legal and policy frameworks involved in recent 
civic space closures, the International Center for Non-profit Law (ICNL) identified the 
following common elements: the proposal and adoption of restrictive CSO laws and of anti-
protest laws; the closure, de-registration and expulsion of CSOs; the adoption and 
manipulation of counterterrorism laws and policies, and the adoption of laws and policies 
that restrict access to resources, notably including foreign funding and affiliations (ICNL 
2016: 10). 
 
Struggles between civil society actors and state and corporate interests over land appear to 
provoke particularly deadly efforts to constrict civic space, with prominent recent violent 
deaths of activists even featuring public execution and witness assassinations on courtroom 
steps. In many instances, these acts of violence are committed with impunity, or without 
recourse to justice. Both state and other, including business interests, are believed to be 
responsible for this epidemic of violence against land rights defenders, and in particular 
against indigenous people (Global Witness 2016). 
 
Efforts to restrict civic space tend to include both formal (legal, regulatory, administrative) 
and a range of informal strategies. Informal strategies cannot always be documented 
through official indicators, but they include discursive means such as the de-legitimation or 
stigmatisation of civil society actors within public discourse, and the overall effects of a 
‘chilling’ environment on freedom of speech, association, and peaceful assembly. They also 
include threats of or actual violence, often via third parties who enjoy effective impunity (as 
noted above). Political economy analysis is particularly important for understanding the 
coalitions of political and economic interest that come together in the restriction of civic 
space in particular countries. 
 
2.3 Drivers of changing civic space 
A recent body of literature has started to analyse the causes, mechanisms, and political 
effects of changing civic space in different contexts. Rather than focusing on civil society 
actors alone, this literature situates the reconfiguration of civic space within wider political 
struggles between political, civic and economic actors. Van der Borgh and Terwindt (2012) 
were among the earliest to consider what shrinking civic space might mean, with their 
analysis of ‘how restrictions on operational space play out should take into account the 
features of the local political context, the particular mix of pressures with which NGOs are 
confronted, and the characteristics, functions and strategies of NGOs themselves’ (Van der 
Borgh and Terwindt 2012: 1068). They concluded that any analysis of what civic space 
meant would need to take into account the political context, including state capacity and the 
nature of the political regime (authoritarian, democratic, etc). Bloodgood et al.(2014) note 
that within OECD countries themselves, NGO regulations vary widely, depending 
substantially on whether the national system is corporatist or pluralist. Relatedly, Lorch and 
Bunk demonstrate how civic space or civil society actors may be co-opted by or on behalf of 
authoritarian regimes, rather than necessarily championing democratic process (Lorch and 
Bunk 2017; Lorch 2008).  
 
For Poppe and Wolff (2017), civic space struggles are about contests over norms that reflect 
competing worldviews and values: the values in relation to which civic space is contested in 
different contexts reflect distinctively different underlying perceptions of justice; 
understanding efforts to restrict civic space means taking claims to justice seriously, and 
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making sense of them as normative – not merely as tactical – interventions. Meanwhile, 
recent findings indicate that the strength of civil society is positively correlated with control of 
corruption, but mainly under conditions of a free press (Themudo 2013), highlighting the 
interconnection between different aspects of civil society action. Media freedom, in turn, is 
related to regime type, with democratic regimes typically the most free, but with different 
degrees of media freedom found across the different types of autocracy (Stier 2015). 
 
The impact of aid on civic space has also been examined. Kendra Dupuy, James Ron and 
Aseem Prakash (2016) have shown that recent restrictions on foreign aid to NGOs in 
competitive political systems tend to relate to perceptions that they support the political 
opposition; such restrictions tend to be concentrated after multiparty elections. In related 
work, they also conclude that bilateral (official) aid flows tend to drop (by about 32 per cent) 
in the years after governments introduce new restrictions on NGO funds, but this relates 
more to donor preferences for funding favoured NGOs, rather than because of their 
disapproval of shrinking civic space (Dupuy and Prakash 2017). The decline in foreign aid to 
NGOs and CSOs is likely to have a direct effect on service delivery, as well as on the 
capacities of such organisations to hold governments to account over development policy 
processes and outcomes. 
 
2.4 Actors, groups and sectors targeted 
The CIVICUS Monitor notes that: 
 
states (and non-state actors in some cases) most often violate civic space by detaining 
activists, protesters and journalists; physically attacking, threatening or harassing 
journalists; and using excessive force against protesters. Other commonly-used tactics 
of repression include intimidation of activists, censorship of the media and the use of 
laws to limit civic freedoms.  
(Gaebee 2017: 5) 
 
In addition, ‘states abuse their monopoly over the power of arrest with appalling frequency’, 
and that once journalists, activists or protesters are detained, this  
 
provides the perfect cover for state agents to intimidate, harass and, in the most 
extreme cases, beat, sexually assault and torture activists. Authorities don’t stop at 
arrest as a means of curbing dissent. Arrest and detention are often the first step in 
deliberate attempts to use the legal system to impede activism by embroiling human 
rights defenders, journalists, opposition politicians and civil society activists in 
uncertain and costly legal processes, which can last for years.  
(Gaebee 2017: 5) 
 
Detention as a tactic of repression appeared in some 292 CIVICUS Monitor reports between 
June 2016 and September 2017 (Gaebee 2017). An illustrative list of targets of shrinking 
civic space in the 2016 CIVICUS Monitor included the following: 
 
 Belgium: protestors have had their rights curtailed and may have experienced police 
abuse; (actors exercising their) freedom of speech in relation to terrorist threats; 
 Benin: the independent media; student associations; 
 Cabo Verde: CSOs, freedom of the media to report on elections; 
 China: disappearances of activists and human rights defenders; detentions of 
dissidents; foreign funding to CSOs and NGOs; foreign and domestic actors; lawyers; 
environmental demonstrators; 
 Cyprus: freedom of expression/the media; 
 El Salvador: media, killing of journalists, LGBTI activists; 
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 Netherlands: anti-racism protestors (police used excess force against); environmental 
protestors; rise in hate speech; journalists forced out, threatened; 
 Yemen: journalists, as well as citizens in general, face extreme violence. 
 
Lesbian, gay, bisexual and trans rights activists have recently been targeted in Russia, 
Chechnya, Ukraine, Georgia, Honduras (Tucker 2016), and across sub-Saharan Africa.4 As 
noted above, land rights defenders, including in particular leaders of indigenous rights 
organisations, are often targets of efforts to shut down civic space to protest land-grabbing, 
dispossession and other illegal rural activities. 
 
The new online civic space openings have also been subject to closures, distortions and 
shut-downs, using both formal and informal methods. Criminal groups use violence to 
intimidate citizen media outlets (Monroy-Hernandez and Palacios 2014) and governments 
use their power to close down social media or the whole of the internet. Authoritarian 
governments, military units, terrorist groups and the ‘alt-right’ now spend millions of dollars 
annually on disinformation to shape discourse, manufacture opinion, and radicalise youth. 
They achieve this in part by employing small armies of human operatives and computerised 
“bots” to influence opinion on social media and across this new digital public sphere 
(Woolley and Howard 2017).  
 
The impacts on civic actors and organisations do not, however, exhaust the analysis of how 
civic space may shape development. In order to assess the full extent of the impact on 
development it is essential to identify how efforts to constrain the actions of actors, groups, 
and sectors affect their capacities to promote transparency and accountability, inclusive and 
equitable service provision, and peaceful means of addressing inequality and injustice on 
which the SDG 2030 Agenda depends. From what we know of the roles of civil society in 
development to date, it is important to consider whether their sphere or reach (how many 
people they can reach, who, in how many places) is affected by formal and informal efforts 
to shrink space, whether through legal, financial, regulatory or administrative means, or 
through informal, discursive or threatening, strategies to bring civil society to heel. It is also 
important to consider whether the quality, in particular the transformative potential, of their 
engagement with both the population and official actors at local, national and transnational 
levels is affected by shrinking space. And finally, it is important to take into consideration 
whether their capacity to support inclusive, equitable, and sustainable models of 
development specifically is constrained, through a reduced capacity to participate 
meaningfully in the policy process, amplify public debate about policy alternatives, scrutinise 
and monitor public policy and the private sector, in particular on behalf of marginalised, 
excluded or disempowered groups. 
 
 
3 Civil society, civic space and development 
3.1 Meanings of civil society 
Civil society is typically defined as the un-coerced middle space or ‘third sector’, between 
state and market, an organisational characteristic of wider society and its engagement with 
political authority and markets. A standard definition is as: 
 
a sphere of social interaction between economy and the state, composed above all of 
the intimate sphere (especially the family), the sphere of associations (especially 
voluntary associations), social movements, and forms of public communication.  
(Cohen and Arato 1994: ix) 
                                                 
4  See: http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/africa-lgbt-rights-activists-worry-trump-impact-50491985 (accessed 
18 October 2017). 
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Figure 3.1 shows a conventional Venn diagram depiction of the spheres of civil society 
interacting with the state and markets. In this model, civil society is distinguishable from 
political society (parties, political organisations, parliaments) but also from the economic 
sphere of firms, business partnerships, and their associations. However, ‘[p]olitical and 
economic society generally arise from civil society, share some of its forms of organization 
and communication, and are institutionalized through rights (political rights and property 
rights especially) continuous with the fabric of rights that secure modern civil society’ (Cohen 
and Arato 1994: x). The boundaries between these spheres are not always fixed or rigid, and 
they are mutually constituted in their interactions. This means that the effects of policy and 
political efforts to narrow the sphere of civil society action necessarily have implications for 
how markets and political society operate, among other things reducing the capacity of civil 
society to address economic inequality in the market. 
 
Figure 3.1 Conventional Venn diagram of civil society in relation to state and market 
 
Source: Authors’ own. 
 
Edwards (2009) highlights the ambiguities in the term, showing that ‘civil society’ has come 
to refer to variously, associational life, ‘the good society’, and the public sphere. However, 
two distinctively different views of civil society, reflecting different intellectual and political 
traditions, inform development thinking and practice. The dominant liberal view of civil 
society is that it comprises organisations and voluntary groups occupying the space 
between, and balancing, the power of the state and the market. This Tocquevillian tradition 
of viewing voluntary associationalism as the fabric of social organisation underpinning 
American democracy, has tended to treat an active and plural civil society as central to 
processes of democratisation, and therefore to development (White 1994; Mercer 2002; 
Leftwich 1993; also Fukuyama 2001). This has been the most influential conception of civil 
society in relation to development, independent of its relevance to the socioeconomic and 
political contexts of post-colonial and peripheral states (Gyimah-Boadi 1996; Mercer 2002; 
Lewis 2002). 
 
An important contrasting view of civil society derives from Marxist political theory via 
Gramsci, who treats the state in capitalist economies as comprising overlapping spheres of 
political society (agents and institutions of the state) and civil society, which ‘manufactures 
consent’ through education, culture, and the media, social movements and voluntary 
organisations (Buttigieg 1995). In the Gramscian view, ‘civil society is a contested space, 
therefore NGOs reflect struggles within wider society’ (Mercer 2002: 11). The activities of 
civil society can serve to support the power (or hegemony) of the ruling class and their state, 
substantially within the constraints of the economic system but it can also be a space for 
contestation and challenge to political and economic power. It is this more transformative 
vision of civil society that has informed several non-Anglophone conceptions, including as 
central to ‘the political imaginary of new social movements’ and as ‘a new path towards 
social transformation’ from the Left in Latin America (Alvarez et al. 2017: 4). In cold war 
Eastern Europe, ‘‘Civil society’ was in many ways the conceptual counterpart to the concept 
Civil 
society
MarketState
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of totalitarianism’ – appealing precisely because any formation outside of the state was 
disallowed (Kotkin 2010: 8), conceived as ‘a more radical form of democratic political praxis; 
an alternative form of politics, which would extend beyond a set of standard liberal 
institutions’ (Kopeckỳ and Mudde 2003: 3). 
 
3.2 The role and contribution of civil society in the development process 
In the final quarter of the 20th century, the concept of civil society re-emerged in 
development thought and practice in association with democratisation and economic 
transition, in contexts of social and political struggle against repressive or authoritarian 
states (Cohen and Arato 1994). Following the Cold War, the global growth of associations, 
NGOs, networks, and other civil society actors in developing and transitioning countries were 
seen as the accompaniment to economic development through markets, rather than driven 
by states. Promoting and creating space for ‘civil society’ fit a variety of development-related 
agendas, from neo-populist proponents of direct participation and more radical champions of 
social solidarity to promoters of conservative or neo-traditionalist social agendas and 
shrinking the state, deregulation and privatisation (White 1994; Howell and Pearce 2002). 
 
The most important development internationally was the proliferation of civil society (or non-
profit) organisations in developing countries since the end of the Cold War (Salamon 1994). 
From the early 1990s there was a flowering of organisations, groups, associations, networks, 
and clubs in the transitional economies of Eastern and Central Europe and elsewhere, as 
well as in the developing but still low-income countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and Latin 
America (Howell and Pearce 2002; Edwards and Hulme 1996b; Mercer 2002). Civic activism 
on human rights grew particularly rapidly from the mid-1980s, substantially through networks 
connecting global and local human rights groups (Tsutsui and Wotipka 2004). There was a 
rapid and sustained growth in the amount of official development assistance (or aid) going to 
NGOs for humanitarian, development and human rights defence purposes. There may be as 
many as a million NGOs worldwide, of which around 35,000 are large institutions recognised 
by the UN; by 2004, around one-third of official development assistance was estimated to be 
channelled through NGOs (Lewis and Kanji 2009). The 1990s’ scramble to supply aid to 
NGOs drew considerable critique, notably for assuming the inherent ‘goodness’ of such 
organisations; conflating the contestation and power struggles associated with civil society 
action with service-providing NGOs; (Stewart 1997; Carothers and Barndt 1999; Lewis 2002; 
Mercer 2002), and for treating NGOs as a ‘magic bullet’ for inclusive development, 
potentially compromising their independence through new dependencies on states and 
donors (Edwards and Hulme 1996b, 1996a). 
 
As befits a domain of such wide definitional range, evaluations of the contribution of civil 
society to development are diverse and variable. A large body of analysis points to a role for 
civil society, broadly conceived, in the emergence of modern economic institutions. The 
historical evidence from now-advanced liberal economic democracies indicates that dense 
networks of social capital, or ‘instantiated, informal norms that produce co-operation’ 
(Fukuyama 2001: 16) were the social foundations of the economic trust that enabled 
banking, contracts, and trade to flourish. At key points in time, regimes of governance moved 
from being closed systems to more ‘open access orders’, in which public policy, 
entrepreneurial capacity and human development could enable economic growth, as well as 
the generation of a surplus to distribute to the discontented or excluded (North et al. 2012).  
 
A more recent assessment of the role of civil society in relation to economic growth in 
developing countries concludes that how the feedback from economic growth shapes the 
‘deals space’ in which markets are governed depends on  
 
how influential groups—such as civil society, the judiciary, the middle class, and the 
media—view the growth process, as well as how non-elites mobilize themselves 
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against elements of the growth process that they see as politically illegitimate. 
(Pritchett, Sen, and Werker 2017: 32) 
  
Based on their close analysis of the political economy of growth in developing countries, 
Pritchett et al. note that in more open and competitive systems, ‘deals’ seen as overly 
exclusionary and predatory are likely to face opposition. In more dominant and closed 
systems, the ruling coalition is vulnerable in the medium-term to challenges from organised 
groups that may include elites and civil society. This means that either way, an economic 
system which is too tightly oriented towards rewarding powerful elite segments will face 
political challenges unless economic opportunity and political and civic space is created for 
alternatives to emerge. Whether countries manage that by opening up systems to wider 
scrutiny, critique and (therefore) political competition, or by further constricting civic space, 
limiting the ‘watchdog’ role of civil society, silencing critics and attempting to control political 
debate in the public space, depends on the interaction of political and economic interests, 
including how these interact in the global system. 
 
More open societies benefit not only from economic trust and ‘social capital’ but also from 
more transparency and stronger public accountability, in particular through the role of civil 
society in uncovering and preventing corruption and other governance failures. A free media 
is closely associated with corruption control across levels of development (Brunetti and 
Weder 2003). As the reach of the media increases and an increasingly educated population 
participate in public debate through the popular and social media, the impacts on corruption 
control are likely to widen further (Dutta and Roy 2016; Jha and Sarangi 2017). The World 
Bank’s recent World Development Report on ‘Governance and the Law’ assigned civil 
society action a specific role in the chain of governance ‘from transparency to accountability’, 
noting civil society successes in extracting greater commitment to transparency from states 
and market actors, publicising failures, violations and abuses, and in demanding (if not 
necessarily enforcing) accountability (World Bank 2017).  
 
Civic activism in relation to accountability for public services is understood to be part of the 
governance apparatus necessary to ensure services ‘work for poor people in development’ 
(World Bank 2003). Civil society can play a role in (a) identifying needs for, exclusion from 
and capture of public services, pushing politicians to respond appropriately; (b) highlighting 
problems with quality, efficiency and resource management, including corruption; and (c) in 
providing information about how well the system works through service-monitoring and user-
feedback. The extent to which NGOs and social movements have succeeded in improving 
services through ‘social accountability’ strategies for holding officials to account has been 
widely debated (Hickey and Mohan 2005; Gaventa and McGee 2013; Mansuri and Rao 
2012). However, a growing consensus is that social accountability functions through 
coalitions of actors and groups across civil society working at multiple levels to raise 
questions and enforce accountability, and not through one-shot development interventions 
(such as the experimental rationing of information) (Fox 2016; Fox 2015).   
 
There is robust evidence that women’s rights organisations and the women’s movement in 
general has played a critical role in advancing gender equality worldwide (Htun and Weldon 
2010, 2012). Civic space has provided more opportunities for women to voice their demands 
than the comparatively closed space of party political competition in most countries. 
Coalitions and alliances with other civil society actors have been vital to the success of 
social movements and campaigns against gender-based violence, among other matters. At 
the same time, the women’s movement is itself shaped by the nature of the civic space, 
becoming incorporated within the state or politics at different moments in the political 
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settlement, while also facing ‘NGOisation’ and dependence on aid donors, with the restrictive 
effects of such financial and institutional ties (Nazneen and Sultan 2014).  
 
Civil society and in particular, enduring social movements against group-based injustices, 
play an important potential role in giving voice and enabling inclusion of other marginalised 
and excluded groups, including ethnic or religious minorities, indigenous, transient or migrant 
populations, people with stigmatised health conditions or occupations, and LGBTI groups 
and individuals. More inclusive political, social and economic institutions may help to resolve 
or diffuse the kinds of ‘horizontal inequalities’ that fuel civil wars if left un-addressed (Stewart 
2000). Civil society has undertaken vital functions in peacebuilding processes, including 
protecting citizens against violence, monitoring human rights violations and the 
implementation of peace agreements, advocacy for peace and human rights, ‘socialization to 
values of peace and democracy as well as to develop the in-group identity of marginalized 
groups’, ‘inter-group social cohesion by bringing people together from adversarial groups’; 
facilitating dialogue at multiple levels and among multiple actors, and service delivery to 
create entry points for these other functions (Paffenholz nd: 5, Paffenholz 2010).  
 
These specific achievements need to be framed within a stronger understanding of ‘the 
varied ways in which associational groupings have tangibly improved societies across the 
world, and in turn advanced global peace, human development and respect for human rights 
… and the imperative of an enabling civic environment and the exercise of the rights to 
freedom of peaceful assembly and of association in achieving these aspirations’ (OHCHR 
2017a: 3). Civil society ‘has always been linked to the notion of minimizing violence in social 
relations, to the public use of reason as a way of managing human affairs in place of 
submission based on fear and insecurity, or ideology and superstition’ (Kaldor 2013: 9). Civil 
society may not prevent war, but ‘it is a way of addressing the problem of war, of debating, 
arguing about, discussing and pressing for possible solutions or alternatives’ (Kaldor 2013: 9). 
 
Contestation is central to how civil society contributes to development, because of the scope 
it creates to recognise, voice, and demand accountability or redress for injustices of all kinds. 
In a report to the recent 35th session of the United Nations Human Rights Council, the 
Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association set out 
the achievements of civil society in light of its contribution to historic social justice victories 
such as those against slavery, apartheid, colonialism, and authoritarianism and in the 
achievements of labour rights and the international women’s movement. The report noted 
that: 
 
In the development field, civil society has played a prominent role in critiquing, 
establishing and strengthening empowering discourses … [illustrating] the gross 
economic inequalities between the vast majority of global citizens and the tiny minority 
that control capital, political influence and means of production ... [struggles against 
austerity, authoritarianism and women’s multiple burdens in the current economic 
climate] succeeded in mobilising people across the globe to express their 
dissatisfaction with current global economic arrangements, illustrating the ability of 
ordinary people – comprising the diversity of the global citizenry – to rally around an 
issue and to question the status quo.  
(OHCHR 2017a: 6) 
 
From a wide review of the achievements of civil society, the Special Rapporteur concluded 
that its contributions and functions included (a) pursuing accountability; (b) supporting 
participation and empowerment of marginalised groups; (c) driving and applying innovation; 
(d) fostering sustainable approaches to development; (e) raising awareness of problems and 
of rights; (f) cultivating alliances, building bridges across divided societies; and (g) ‘shared 
humanity’, in particular in the form of humanitarian assistance to all (OHCHR 2017a). With 
respect to development, civil society plays a particularly crucial role in policy advocacy for 
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pro-poor and inclusive policies (Gaventa and McGee 2010). Civil society was active in 
relation to the pursuit of the MDGs, and played a key role in the final shape of the SDGs. 
The ‘sector’ is firmly established within the global aid architecture, as crucial to inclusive 
partnership-based policymaking and effective monitoring. Civil society has come to be seen 
as critical to global governance (Scholte 2004), including corporate governance and global 
policymaking (World Economic Forum 2012; Schwab 2008; Grant 2011). The range of 
activities and functions ascribed to civil society support the view that the space for civil 
society to operate is essential to achievement of the SDGs, in particular the injunction to 
‘leave no one behind’ which requires addressing exclusion and inequality as a priority (HLPE 
2013; PartnersGlobal et al. 2017). Global civil society has also come to be seen as critical to 
global governance (Scholte 2004), including corporate governance (World Economic Forum 
2012; Schwab 2008; Grant 2011).  
 
One of the frontiers of civil society in development is the creation and expansion of new 
online civic spaces (Boyd 2011) which represent new ‘claimed spaces’ (Gaventa 2005) and a 
new digital ‘public sphere’ (Habermas 1991) in which people form social identities, build 
counter-narratives and forge new social movements (Fraser 1992). These new online civic 
spaces are already being used for diverse development purposes: as refuges and organising 
spaces to express identities, rehearse resistance, form policy demands, and to mobilise 
influence and social action (Baker and Blaagaard 2016). Digital civic action from the global 
north such as the #BlackLivesMatter and #MeToo campaigns where civic actors were able to 
organise resistance online before mobilising for change in offline spaces are well-known. 
Less well-known are examples from the global south such as Ushahidi where civic actors 
were able to mobilise for change around post-election violence (Okolloh 2009) and 
HarassMap as an example of creating digital spaces to combat violence against women 
(Peuchaud 2014).  
 
Elsewhere, citizen media channels have proliferated (Baker and Blaagaard 2016) allowing 
oppressed and exiled groups to represent themselves in their own words and images and to 
amplify their counter-narratives about subjects ranging from narco-trafficking to illegal drone 
wars in Pakistan and Somalia. However, little is known to date of how and under what 
circumstances online civic space provides new opportunities - or barriers - to achieving 
development, although a body of work is beginning to emerge (e.g., Gurumurthy, Bharthur, 
and Chami 2017; Ali 2011). It seems clear that building the digital skills and capabilities of 
civic actors to make productive use of online civic space requires more of our attention. If the 
acts of authoritarian governments shrink civic space and have a ‘chilling effect’ on self-
censorship and diminished agency then we might reasonably expect a ‘warming effect’ to 
radiate from the opening of online civic spaces and their projection of opposition voices and 
their articulation of development alternatives. However, earlier optimism about the role of 
digital public space in advancing development through online-enabled civic engagement has 
now waned, or perhaps been replaced by greater realism (Herringshaw 2018). Recent 
research finds that technology is more effective at plugging information gaps and creating 
new spaces for citizen-state interaction than in creating space for deliberative dialogue, 
strengthening public accountability, or building citizen trust in the state (McGee et al. 2018).  
 
3.3 Uncivil society and unruly civics 
Normative conceptions of civil society as ‘the good society’ have long been challenged by 
recognition of its ‘uncivil’ or illiberal forms, and of the grey area between civic action and 
political struggle, reflecting the importance of contestation in the roles of civil society. This 
aspect of civil society remains under-studied (Glasius 2010), as do the implications for civic 
space more generally. Not all actors in the civil society space promote the progressive or 
rights-based agendas assumed by liberal conceptions (Stewart 1997; Rahman 2002; 
Kopeckỳ and Mudde 2003; Kotkin 2010). The increasing prominence of extremist, 
exclusionary or identity-based concerns, and of movements or actions that use illegal or 
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even violent means to advance their agenda, seems likely to have contributed to the official 
backlash against civil society. The clash of values of diverse civic actors with unequal 
resources and access to power ‘inevitably complicates the link between forms and norms 
that lies at the heart of neo-Tocquevillian thinking’; it points also to the need for associational 
life ‘to be politically ordered if the huge diversity of positions and interests is to be 
consolidated in service to some broader national or international agenda’ (Edwards 2009: 
56–57). In other words, a strong civil society depends on a state strong enough and capable 
enough to create and govern the civic space in ways that advance inclusive development 
goals.  
 
In addition to the advance of uncivil society (racist, sexist, extremist or exclusionary faith-
based groups, and otherwise illiberal organisations) in many regions, a wave of protest 
movements and demonstrations, including ‘uncivic activism’ (Alvarez et al. 2017) or ‘unruly 
politics’ (Tadros 2011; Khanna 2012) occupied a growing portion of civil society space in the 
early part of the 21st century. These mobilisations responded to the inequalities and 
volatilities in the global economy, and erupted in apparently spontaneous crowd-based 
actions that defied social movement theorising and the old categorisations of liberal civil 
society thought. The global food, fuel and financial crises of the 2007-12 period were marked 
by protests, riots, and more enduring forms of organisation, such as the Indignado and 
Occupy movements, as well as the anti-authoritarian struggles in the Arab world (Ortiz et al. 
2013; Barnett 2011; Carothers and Youngs 2015; Anderson 2011; Ansani and Daniele 2012; 
Tadros 2012). This recent wave of protests further blurs neat distinctions between civil and 
political society. The history of revolutions is the history of civil society actors being pushed 
into violent struggles when they encounter a closed state and exclusionary political 
settlement which prevents peaceful change, even as formerly revolutionary groups can enter 
political or civic life in post-conflict settings. Unruly protests may emerge in response to 
formal elite civil society failures to represent mass concerns about basic economic and 
social rights (see, for instance, Chatterjee 2004; de Brito et al. 2014). While these struggles 
are distinctively different from the civic modes of NGO and CSO organisation, there is also 
much continuity, overlap and traffic between these actors and actions within the civic space 
(Alvarez et al. 2017; Hossain and Scott-Villiers 2017). The role of the media in bringing such 
struggles into the public sphere and amplifying their concerns appears to be of particular 
importance (Hossain et al. 2017), even if the roles of the mass and social media in triggering 
or mobilising such protests may have been over-stated at times (Fuchs 2012; Tufekci and 
Wilson 2012). Citing Avritzer, Glasius notes that the civility of civil society is interdependent 
with that of the state and market: civil society is most likely to take uncivil forms when states 
are too weak to assure human security, the market is organised along clientelistic lines, and 
political society is so fragmented as to barely exist (Glasius 2010: 4). 
 
 
4 The politics of inclusive development 
4.1 Development as the SDGs: sustainability, equality, and inclusion 
How the impact of shrinking civil society space on development outcomes is assessed 
depends substantially on what is meant by development, and on the underlying political 
economy in any particular context. Analysis of the relationship between democracy and 
development has tended to treat economic growth rates as an indicator of development 
(Barro 1996; Doucouliagos and Ulubaşoğlu 2008; Heo and Tan 2001; Minier 1998; Plümper 
and Martin 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006); although see also (Baum and Lake 2003). 
However, a richer and more human-centred conception of development pays priority to 
those at greatest risk of being ‘left behind’. The ‘Guiding Principles on Extreme Poverty and 
Human Rights’ encourage a view of human dignity as at the foundation of human rights, 
noting that ‘persons living in poverty face daily violations of their civil, cultural, economic, 
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political and social rights, which interact and mutually reinforce one another with devastating 
effects’, in an illustration of ‘the indivisibility, interrelatedness and interdependence of human 
rights’ (UN 2012: 6). The Agenda 2030 Declaration frames development as a matter of 
tackling inequalities of power and resources, with the SDGs aiming to:  
 
end poverty and hunger everywhere; to combat inequalities within and among 
countries; to build peaceful, just and inclusive societies; to protect human rights and 
promote gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls; and to ensure the 
lasting protection of the planet and its natural resources.  
(UN 2015) 
 
In its efforts to assess the impacts of shrinking civic space on development, SDG16, (to 
‘promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to 
justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels’), provides 
a useful starting point, as it draws attention to how changes in civic space affect key actors 
and inclusive processes. The greater challenge is to trace the impacts further downstream, 
on the politics of policymaking and implementation in relation to ending poverty (SDG1), 
hunger (SDG2), health and wellbeing (SDG3), quality education (SDG4), gender equality 
(SDG5), as well as water and sanitation SDG6). 
 
4.2 A polity approach to civic space 
Contemporary aid and development thinking tends to assume that open space for multiple, 
varied civil society actors to operate will protect basic civil and political rights and contribute 
to inclusive development processes that are equitable across all groups in society in ways 
that meet social justice imperatives, and are sustainable over time and the available 
resources. Civil society is particularly important in helping to guarantee that nobody gets left 
behind. CIVICUS explains the value of civic space as follows: 
 
Civic space is the bedrock of any open and democratic society. When civic space is 
open, citizens and civil society organisations are able to organise, participate and 
communicate without hindrance. In doing so, they are able to claim their rights and 
influence the political and social structures around them. This can only happen when a 
state holds by its duty to protect its citizens and respects and facilitates their 
fundamental rights to associate, assemble peacefully and freely express views and 
opinions.  
(CIVICUS nd) 
 
This ‘polycentric’ view of the rights-based politics of inclusive development assumes that the 
‘uncoordinated and decentralized actions of civil society, market, and state actors are likely 
to create a mutually reinforcing movement that can produce all good things for all people’ 
(Houtzager 2003: 1–2). It is consistent with a view that civil society can successfully be 
strengthened with external aid and relationships. Certainly, the evidence from the developing 
world suggests that transnational civil society networks and movements have helped 
national and local actors win important peaceful victories in areas of public service provision, 
recognition and human rights, and participation and political empowerment (Gaventa and 
Barrett 2010; Gaventa and Martorano 2016). However, historical evidence suggests that the 
broad policy agendas that brought about comparatively inclusive and equitable forms of 
economic development may be substantially driven by states, and that the successful 
engagement of civil society has as much to do with how state-civil society relations shape 
the constructive engagements between these spheres, as to the free and uncoordinated 
actions of multiple civil society groups.  
 
In this view it is not so much the uncoordinated and autonomous actions of ‘a million flowers 
blooming’ as it is the ‘fit’ between state and civil society actors – how successfully state and 
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civil society interact to enable economic growth and human development - that shapes the 
inclusiveness of the development process. At times, the state may create wider and more 
enabling space for civic action, and this may lead to progressive and redistributive 
programmes and policies as political actors respond to newly salient voices. At other times 
and in other parts of the system, the ‘fit’ is tighter, as when civil society actors collaborate 
with states or the administration in the co-production of services (Joshi and Moore 2004). At 
key moments of contention, the ‘fit’ is in gridlock, such as when civil society clashes with the 
state, politicians, or powerful economic interests defending the rights of the less powerful. 
The degree of autonomy, influence, and ‘holding power’ of civic actors in relation to the state 
is thus closely shaped by the nature of the state and the political regime, which structure the 
conditions for political inclusion and empowerment (Houtzager 2003). So while civil society 
makes demands for inclusion and empowerment, it does so in conditions not of their own 
making (at least not in the short-term, although civil society actors have been part of recent 
constitutional reforms in Nepal and Myanmar). Recognising the centrality of the nature of 
political power in this ‘polity approach’ places state and political institutions at the heart of the 
explanation of how civil society contributes to inclusive development.  
 
This emphasis on ‘fit’ (as opposed to size and autonomy) focuses attention on whether civic 
space is configured to enable state, civil society, and market to work together to deliver 
development. Figure 4.1 depicts this more dynamic (compared to Figure 3.1’s conventional 
Venn diagram depiction) relationship between civil society, state and market. ‘Civic space’ is 
here understood not as the size of the civil society sphere itself, but as the space within 
which it engages with the state and the market to keep the gears of development in motion. 
Distance and proximity from, but also capacity to engage with, state and market are critical 
to the role of civil society in galvanising inclusive development. If civil society is too small and 
weak to engage, the state and/or market may capture the process without concern for less 
powerful or marginalised societal interests. If civil society is big or strategic enough to stall 
the machine, preventing business or governments from operating in their individual or joint 
interests unfettered, this may retard unequalising and unjust development policies, avoiding 
corrupt extractive or land deals and the ecological impact of unregulated development, and 
encouraging further resistance. From the perspective of states, however, such blockages 
may impact on the pace or direction of growth, and the state’s capacity for revenue 
generation and service delivery, reducing public trust in the state or political leadership. It is 
not only states that seek to influence civic space: market actors may also benefit from a 
weakened civil society if the role of such groups has been to protect against predatory, 
extractive, or abusive practices. Where oppositions are fragmented and state capacity weak, 
particularly under conditions of violent conflict, the (limited) civic space may be filled with 
service-providing NGOs in humanitarian fields. However, their presence tends to be 
conditional on the alignment of their activities with ruling elite interests, and they are 
dispensable, even if global civil society resists. 
 
As indicated by the broken boundary lines, the state, civil society and the market are 
depicted in Figure 4.1 as porous spheres, allowing movement of people, resources and 
ideas between them. We know that NGOs turn to social enterprise to finance their efforts; 
businesses establish philanthropic foundations and CSR to give something back and 
strengthen their brand; both organise with civil and political society to advance their 
agendas; and elites move between positions of power across all three spheres. This means 
that multiple interests may be at stake in the configuration of civic space. Figure 4.1 is a 
generic depiction that can be amended to show how changing civic space may affect the 
‘gears’ or mechanisms of development, and to depict how global civil society enlarges civic 
space but leaves national civil society to manage the frictions that arise out of global 
incursions into the national space. 
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Figure 4.1 A polity approach to civic space and national development processes 
 
Source: Authors’ own.  
 
4.3 Political settlements and inclusive development 
One review of the evidence on the politics of inclusive development concluded that: 
 
the most significant lesson in international development over the past 15 years is that 
politics lies at the core of this challenge. Development is not simply about what needs 
to be done, but, perhaps more importantly, about how it is done. Politics, power and 
the interactive dynamic between actors and structures shape institutions and give 
them substance and meaning. This has placed the need to understand political 
settlements and how they frame developmental trajectories at the heart of current 
international thinking and practice on state-building and peace-building. 
(Rocha Menocal 2017: 560) 
 
The term ‘inclusive development’ within political science generally refers to the shared 
benefits of growth, in the form of income and wealth, wellbeing, human development, and 
personal security; Rocha Menocal explicitly adds inclusive processes of decision-making 
about what development should look like and how it should be pursued, on grounds that 
inclusive processes are necessary to engender and institutionalise development outcomes 
that are sustainable, equitable and inclusive, in line with the SDGs (Rocha Menocal 2017).  
 
Political settlements, or the ‘balance or distribution of power between contending social 
groups and classes, on which any state is based’ (Di John and Putzel 2009: 4) help us make 
sense of how and the extent to which civil society and civic space shape the distribution and 
the process of development policymaking. Two factors matter most:  
 
 the stability of institutional arrangements; the balance of power seems stable enough 
for ruling elites to be assured of the long-time horizons that would permit them to 
undertake the transformative but politically-difficult reforms needed to achieve 
conditions for long-term growth and development, or insulate them against external or 
popular protests or demands; 
State
Market
Civil 
society
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 the nature of ruling coalitions, which shape elite commitment and state capacity to 
deliver inclusive development, through the incorporation of diverse concerns, and 
political and institutional incentives for redistributive policies and programmes.  
(Hickey, Sen, and Bukenya 2015) 
 
Political settlements are rarely static, and the distribution of power and its implications for 
development may shift for a number of reasons. Other than in the most closed states, civil 
society actors have the potential to play a role in both the stability of institutional 
arrangements and the nature of ruling coalitions. In key instances, civil society actors have 
contributed to regime change, the empowerment of excluded or marginalised groups, and to 
holding politicians and officials accountable for failures, violations or abuses of power in 
ways that materially altered the balance of power.5   
 
The relationship between inclusive outcomes and inclusive processes of development may 
be neither linear nor obvious, and trade-offs and reversals between the two are frequent. It is 
widely acknowledged, for instance, that basic civil and political rights are abrogated in 
countries that have been celebrated for their development ‘successes’ – Rwanda and 
Ethiopia, most recently, as well as in the best example of non-democratic development, 
namely China. These countries have combined rapid poverty reduction and improvements in 
human development in comparatively closed civic spaces within what are known as 
‘dominant’ political settlements (Hickey, Sen, and Bukenya 2015; Khan 2010). Critics have 
raised valid questions about the sustainability, equality, and overall inclusiveness of such 
development ‘successes’. At the same time, more open and democratic arrangements of 
political power such as in Brazil and India, highlight the slow nature of progress on social 
and economic inequality under pluralist systems (Rocha Menocal 2017, 2015). The role of 
civil society in development progress thus complicates a simple conception of more civic 
space as necessarily and inevitably supportive of inclusive development. It indicates the 
need for a more politically-sophisticated understanding of how civil society interacts with the 
politics of development to generate more or less constructive development outcomes. 
 
Any understanding of the impacts of shrinking civil society space must also situate these 
national-level power struggles within their global context, reflecting the extent to which 
states, civil society actors, and markets are subject to transnational influences, ideas and 
resource flows. The fit between states and civil societies differ everywhere; they are also 
situated within changing market and social relations, at global, national and local levels 
(Howell and Pearce 2002). Yet there is a common thread in the efforts to shrink civil society 
space, several strategies for which have been replicated across otherwise different settings 
(Mendelson 2015a). It is necessary also to note that part of the shrinkage may come from 
the civil society politics within the international community, reflecting the narrowing civic 
space within the global north and within a more multipolar world system, as well as such 
movements within the large, regionally influential BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa) countries (Poskitt, Shankland, and Taela 2016). 
 
It is helpful to think about the effects of shrinking civic space on development within wider 
struggles over the balance of power in a country. What ultimately matters for inclusive 
development is elite commitment and state capacity to deliver, both of which civil society and 
shrinking space may affect. Civil society actors may themselves be large membership 
organisations that deliver important services, supplementing or replacing state services, 
thereby shaping (undermining, complementing, or co-providing) state capacity to deliver. 
Civil society may also shape elite ideas and commitment to development; a good ‘fit’ with the 
relevant agencies of state may mean civil society plays a positive role in the development of 
state capacity to respond to collective concerns. Efforts to shrink civil society space can then 
                                                 
5  Further discussion of civil society in relation to political settlements in 12 countries is provided in Part II of this report, 
Country Narratives. 
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be understood as efforts by states or ruling parties to consolidate or regain power, 
undermining support to political opponents, disempowering dissidents and critics of the 
government or regime, or wresting back control of services and communication with 
population groups. The strategies may be ideological, physical, material, or regulatory in 
nature, but we can assume that in each instance, the effort is informed by a presumption 
among state powerholders that (particular) civil society actors have too much or illegitimate 
power. 
 
5  Mechanisms through which closing civic 
space may shape development outcomes 
From our overview of the conceptual literature and recent discussions of shrinking civic 
space around the world, we derived a series of broad propositions about the mechanisms 
through which changes in the civic space may impact on development in a variety of political 
settlements. We then developed these into a typology, following the methods used by the 
social provisioning approach of the Effective States and Inclusive Development (ESID) 
research programme, along the lines laid out in Figure 5.1. 
 
Figure 5.1 A typology of political settlements, selected countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Competitive 
 
 
Dominant 
 
 
Developmental 
 
Brazil 
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Russia 
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 Mozambique 
 Zimbabwe 
 
Source: Authors’ own, adapted from frameworks developed by the Effective States and Inclusive Development (ESID) 
Research Centre at the University of Manchester.  
 
These propositions were explored through desk-based studies of the implications of closing 
civic space for development in 13 countries: Bangladesh, Brazil, Cambodia, China, 
Colombia, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Myanmar/Burma, Nepal, Pakistan, Russia, Rwanda and 
Zimbabwe. For each country, we produced an analysis that drew together analysis of how 
changing civic space was being shaped by the dynamics of the political settlement in each 
context, and of the challenges of sustainable and inclusive development in each. In this 
section we reflect on the findings in relation to the following four propositions. 
 
Proposition I: In a political settlement presided over by a dominant political system in which 
the state has both the capacity and the elite commitment necessary to foster inclusive 
development outcomes, tighter civic space may have adverse impacts on: 
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 the rights and needs of marginalised and excluded groups;  
 the perceived credibility of official performance data, with possible impacts on FDI 
flows and the business environment; 
 environmental sustainability, across a wide range of potential areas and sectors. 
 
These propositions apply in particular to the light grey quadrant (China, Ethiopia and 
Rwanda) in the typology. In each instance, recent efforts to consolidate power by the ruling 
elite have been associated with a clampdown on civil society and the media.  
 
In respect of the rights and needs of marginalised and excluded groups, it is clear that rural-
urban migrants and excluded ethnic and geographical groups in China and the restive 
Oromo and Amhara in Ethiopia are instances of systematic exclusion of key social groups in 
the society, some of whose struggles have presented a significant threat to the ruling elite’s 
control of power. In Ethiopia, during the period of the present study, the fragility of the 
political settlement was underlined by the resignation of the Prime Minister Hailemariam 
Desalegn and his replacement with a leader from an Oromo background, Abiy Ahmed, in 
April 2018. This came about after protests over land rights and related political discontent 
among politically marginalised groups rendered the regime’s hold on power untenable (Al 
Jazeera 2018). In China, Xi Jinping’s accession to power at the 18th Party Congress in 
November 2012 marked a new chapter of deepening reform, including ambitions for 
substantial improvements in governance and in the role of China in the world (Men and 
Tsang 2016). Yet Xi Jinping’s economic model of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics in a 
new era’ continues the development pathway of the previous decades – a party-state 
capitalism in which the Communist Party-state dominates the economy and markets, in 
which institutions for sustainable development, basic human rights and the rule law, have not 
been established (Kuo and Feng 2017). After a period of liberalisation of civic space under 
the leadership of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, civil society is now seen by President Xi and 
the Communist Party as ‘an attempt to dismantle the party’s social foundation’ and advocacy 
by social movements is regarded as a serious form of political opposition (Mitchell 2016).  
 
Political power in Rwanda has been dominated by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) since 
the genocide of 1994, and contenders to state power are weak, fragmented, and under 
threat (Reuters 2017). For reasons of political history (Gready 2010), however, the political 
elite is powerfully motivated towards what it understands to be inclusive development (Booth 
and Golooba-Mutebi 2014; Behuria and Goodfellow 2016). The Rwanda contradiction of 
authoritarian politics with development progress (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2012; Harrison 
2017) highlights the need for ‘reasonable expectations’ with respect to human rights, in 
awareness of the severity of the post-genocide development and political challenge 
(Harrison 2017: 876).  
 
Yet the dominant nature of political power, reliant in part on a closed and co-opted civic 
space (ICNL 2017b) may itself undermine the material gains from development. The ‘decent 
technocratic governance’ sufficient to deliver public services and growth to date may be 
endangered by the underlying fragility of the country’s political governance (Reyntjens 2015). 
While Rwanda’s success with respect to economic growth (Behuria and Goodfellow 2016) 
health and other social indicators (Abbott, Sapsford, and Binagwaho 2017) has been widely 
noted, more complex challenges of public service delivery – raising the quality of basic 
education, for instance – have proven difficult (Williams 2017). Poverty and inequality may 
have worsened for some (Ansoms and Rostagno 2012). In a closed and authoritarian setting 
featuring the all-important ‘performance contracts’ (imihigo), ‘local officials often implement 
the set targets rigidly and blindly, regardless of the possible negative consequences for the 
local population’ (Ansoms et al. 2017: 54), signalling the weakness of downward 
accountability. There is also evidence that, rather than resisting bad policies or proposing 
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alternatives, rural populations compensate or take the losses, with negative implications for 
the SDGs on issues such as health and food security. 
  
No specific evidence on the impacts of closed space on perceptions of official economic 
data, which can be viewed as a form of transnational economic trust or social capital, was 
uncovered. However, it would in principle be possible to undertake an analysis of factors that 
contribute to or undermine transnational economic trust by investigating relevant episodes of 
contestation over the freedom of the media, and scholarly and expert analysis through a 
comparative analysis of financial and risk reporting. 
 
Contestation over large land and extractive industries deals features in all three countries, at 
home and (in the case of China) also abroad. The long time-horizons of dominant elites such 
as these enable them to push through big, potentially illegal or unpopular projects that elites 
facing more competitive pressures can struggle to. Corruption on a grand scale is likely in 
the absence of scrutiny. In such cases, contention emerges over environmental 
sustainability, corruption or the loss of indigenous or rural people’s rights. It should be noted 
that similar large-scale land, extractive or energy investments are also found in the dark grey 
(competitive – particularly Brazil and Colombia) and black (dominant-predatory, Russia, 
Cambodia, Mozambique) quadrants of the set; there is therefore, likely to be more to explain 
about what connects such struggles over civic space across these distinctly different political 
types.  
 
Proposition II: In more competitive political systems:  
 
 civic space may help to enhance the quality, depth and reach of democratic dialogue, 
creating more accountable and responsive policies and programmes as governments 
reap the benefits of legitimacy from development performance; however 
 less powerful groups - women, workers, small farmers, displaced persons, minority 
groups - may not be properly incorporated within the political settlement through strong 
party ties because they are not sufficiently powerful; their political expressions may 
then take the form of more direct action - wage, subsidy or price protests, or resistance 
to extractives or development. These tend to be comparatively open and globalised 
economies, where citizens enjoy limited social protection against the life-cycle, 
economic volatility or the environment; 
 civil society may come to be organised along ethnic or partisan lines, becoming too 
close to the state for civic space to provide both the engagement and the distance 
needed for successfully advancing development in fair and lasting ways.  
 
Countries in the dark grey quadrant of the typology (Brazil, Colombia, Nepal and 
Bangladesh) do appear to experience many of the inclusionary and empowering effects of 
comparatively autonomous and plural civil society in participating to set the development 
agenda. Each has seen somewhat equalising and relatively rapid human development 
advances for the poor or the poorest in the past two decades (Lustig, Lopez-Calva, and 
Ortiz-Juarez 2013; UNDP 2016; Government of Nepal 2016; Hossain 2017). However, 
important groups have been unevenly incorporated within each political settlement, as 
highlighted by economic shocks (and in Nepal, natural disasters), in which labour in global 
production chains, small farmers, and the urban poor protested against rising prices, subsidy 
reductions or inadequate services.  
 
There are some signs in each of these countries that space is shrinking by ‘suffocation’, as 
civil society actors and organisations become more closely affiliated with actors and 
organisations within the state, as well as with parties and other broad-based groupings. 
Brazil is a particularly interesting case because of how successfully social goals were 
incorporated into PT (Workers’ Party) policy, but with the legacy of a severed vertical 
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accountability between party and citizens (Hagopian 2016). Nepal similarly seeks to 
incorporate civil society with its demands for equality, recognition, and space, within the 
framework of its new constitution (Drucza 2016). Nationalistic framings, perhaps particularly 
those framed in terms of historical injustice, can be an important part of this process of 
incorporation (also in Bangladesh). 
 
Proposition III: Under conditions where a dominant party lacks the capacity and elite 
commitment to deliver inclusive outcomes: 
 
 excluded and marginalised groups are likely to suffer most through a lack of voice and 
political pressure on political elites; 
 struggles against elite interests (land-grabbing, extractives, monopolies) are likely to 
fail; 
 we would not expect major and sustained protest movements in the development-
predatory quarter of the diagram, because they would not expect a positive response. 
We would expect people in such countries to attempt migration where the local 
economy was not affording a sustainable living, and/or to be more likely to engage in 
extremist politics, including the use of violence. 
 
This proposition applies to the countries in the black quadrant, denoting that power is highly 
concentrated, but not primarily in the interests of delivering inclusive, equitable and 
sustainable development, and includes Russia, Cambodia, Myanmar/Burma, Mozambique 
and Zimbabwe. It should be noted that of these five countries, all but Russia are increasingly 
open or challenged political systems.6 Ruling elites face strong intra-elite pressures 
(Zimbabwe); contention from new political groupings, including the online urban generation 
(Mozambique, Cambodia); and the need for tactical alliances with other powerholders 
(Myanmar/Burma). Pressure to enhance development performance legitimacy can 
reasonably be expected to be high. However, it is also clear that marginalised and 
stigmatised groups enjoy limited to no rights in these societies (the Rohingya and other 
minority groups in Myanmar, and LGBTI groups in Russia) (Beech 2017; Bhatia 2017; 
Brechenmacher 2017). Freedom of association and freedom of speech are abused through 
bans and efforts to discredit protestors or critics, including through the deployment of ‘fake 
news’ (McPherson 2017). Scholars and experts have been under particular pressure in 
Mozambique (Cisse 2015), and independent labour organisation is violently suppressed in 
Cambodia (Human Rights Watch 2015; Ward and Mouyly 2016). As proposed, struggles 
against powerful economic elite interests tends to fail in these contexts.  
 
The proposition that major sustained protest movements would not be found in this quadrant 
did not hold up. Mozambique saw two episodes of major urban and cross-country struggles 
over commodity price hikes in 2008 and 2010; these were not sustained movements, but 
they were of sufficient scale and impact to constitute a significant political shock, alongside 
the rise of the urban-based opposition (de Brito et al. 2014). Similarly motivated protests in 
2007 in Myanmar/Burma triggered by fuel price rises escalated into the national ‘Saffron 
Revolution’, once the priesthood became involved (Shen and Chan 2010).  
 
Proposition IV: In all four: 
 
 freedom of speech and association may be seen as direct threats to state power, 
particularly with the growth of cyberspace; efforts to constrict entry to this space are as 
likely as efforts to tap its potential for development; 
                                                 
6  On the changing balance of power in Cambodia, see (Mccargo 2014; Osborne 2015; ICNL 2017a); for Mozambique, 
see (de Brito et al. 2014; Vines et al. 2015); for Myanmar/Burma, see (Huang 2017; USIP 2017b). 
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 contestation over ‘foreign’ norms promoted by human rights defenders and civic actors 
is likely to be politicised and deployed to rationalise restrictions on civic space 
motivated by political power struggles; 
 wage, natural resource, and commodity price-related struggles are also likely in each 
kind of political system, reflecting the volatilities of global economic integration. We 
would expect more wage and subsistence protests in settings where populations 
expect a positive response, even if they also have reason to fear violence. 
 
We find that these propositions hold across political types as indicated. To a significant 
degree, we would expect some of the impacts of shrinking civic space on development are 
shaped by a country’s position within the global system.  
 
Additional issues arising from this analysis include the intensity of struggles over large land 
and extractive deals and their frequency across political types. This strongly suggests that 
the most intense efforts to shrink civic space relates to some fundamental processes of 
economic development in the current model, in particular the accumulation of capital (Beban, 
So and Un 2017; Lavers 2012; Adnan 2013; Borras et al. 2011).  
 
Gendered impacts of shrinking civic space may also be discerned in particular policy 
domains, notably in relation to export-oriented manufacturing labour (Cambodia and 
Bangladesh; potentially also Ethiopia), where a large majority of workers are women. 
Gender equality also features in the defence of land and indigenous rights, as women play a 
prominent frontline role, particularly in Latin America (CIVICUS 2017; Mesoamerican 
Initiative of Women Human Rights Defenders 2015). Women also lose out in particular in 
relation to the inclusiveness of public policymaking, including in relation to models of 
economic development and patterns of public spending, as women benefit more than men 
from public spending oriented to the reproductive sector (Elson 2010; Balakrishnan, Heintz, 
and Elson 2016). 
 
Efforts to shape public discourse through manipulation or restriction of social media and 
online platforms as well as through restrictions on freedom of speech, on the media as a 
whole and on scholars, experts and artists indicate a strong awareness on the part of elite 
classes of the significance of the public space and the need to win public opinion. There is 
plainly an important dimension in which the shrinking of civic space is an effort to narrow or 
influence the public space in which political opinions get formulated, for ideological and 
mobilisational purposes. Any development implications of this attempt to dominate public 
space has not, to date, been considered, although such capture of public space by ruling 
elites is an increasingly important global concern. 
 
Analysis of the development implications of shrinking civic space must recognise the multiple 
levels at which contestation is taking place, and the transnational nature of many of the 
actors and relationships involved. Aid dependence by national civil society exposes it to 
charges of adverse foreign influence, which may be hard to contest in strongly nationalistic 
public discourses, or where the media is biased in favour of powerful economic actors 
(employers, corporations). That there are multiple global debates taking place about social 
and cultural values in public life is clear, and at least some of these struggles are framed in 
terms of ‘authentic’ versus imported values, perhaps particularly in relation to international 
human rights. At the same time, the spill-over effects of closing civic space in one country 
may be felt very clearly in another, in an interconnected globe. Efforts to consolidate political 
power in China, for instance, appears to be shaping civic space in countries as diverse as 
Cambodia, Nepal and Pakistan, among others. 
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6  Conclusions 
6.1 A constriction of liberal civic space 
This literature review supported the view that a global and comparatively recent wave of 
efforts to restrict civic space has been adversely affecting the activities and security of many 
civil society actors. But not all actors in the civic space have been equally affected. The main 
targets of new restrictions on civic space have been, broadly speaking, aligned along a 
human rights-based development agenda, and include: 
 
 principally foreign-funded and formally constituted NGOs and CSOs in developing and 
transitional countries, addressing local concerns from poverty and inequality to the 
environment and corruption; 
 democratic development and human rights-based organisations with strong 
transnational connections to their organisational parents or funders in the global north, 
known as INGOs (international NGOs) or transnational civil society; 
 social movements and organisations of marginalised and disempowered groups (e.g. 
workers, peasants, people living in poverty, climate or conflict refugees, women, 
indigenous, minority and excluded groups); and  
 the media and academic channels through which these actors investigate and highlight 
issues, articulate demands and mobilise public opinion in the civic space. 
 
There is a great deal of interaction between these groups and actors, as well as between 
business, politics and government, so that (for instance) restrictions on NGOs or media 
groups will have second-level effects on development through their relationships in the wider 
society and polity. 
 
Even while advocates of democracy and human rights in development have seen their 
freedom to operate constrict, by contrast, and during the same period, other groups have 
been granted, occupied or created wider space in the civic sphere, again, across countries 
around the world. These include: 
 
 ‘uncivil society’, or identity or group-based collectivities, often situated on the political 
far right, espousing nativist or racialist ideologies and policies, often on behalf of mid- 
and lower-income groups in the majority population; 
 ‘unruly’ political protest, in particular mass urban protests around goods and services 
deemed essential to everyday life; in the past decade, these have included food riots, 
energy protests, anti-austerity demonstrations, strikes and occupations;  
 the rapid growth of digital or virtual public space, and the fairly sudden emergence of 
multiple alternative channels for the broadcast of news, views, memes and 
information, which are also facing a crackdown in countries around the world. 
 
Given the significance of these changes in the civic spaces of both developed and 
developing countries, it may be more accurate to speak of civic space as changing - in who 
participates and on what terms - rather than as ‘shrinking’ or ‘closing’, on aggregate. 
 
6.2 Civil society and development 
The literature on the contribution of civil society draws attention to the multiple mechanisms 
through which actors engage in the civic space over development issues: through co-
producing or complementing public goods, identifying policy priorities and raising demands, 
monitoring progress, and in general holding the system to account. The international aid 
architecture, and specifically the SDG 2030 Agenda, assumes a significant role for civil 
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society actors of all kinds, based on an understanding that civil society has played such a 
role in the past.  
 
Traditions of civil society vary widely across contexts, but the growth of foreign-funded 
NGOs and CSOs working in development in the past few decades has introduced a shared 
focus on rights-based approaches to empower marginalised and excluded groups. The 
NGOs and CSOs and the more local social movements with whom they partner, the actors 
now facing the brunt of the wave of new restrictions, typically focus on people living on low 
and precarious incomes or in remote or ecologically or politically fragile settings, including 
women’s rights organisations, defenders of the environment or of the rights of indigenous or 
minority populations, as well as service-providing groups. It can be assumed that new 
restrictions are most likely to block civic space in which the concerns of the most 
marginalised and disempowered people have a good chance of being aired and addressed. 
In terms of the SDGs, the effects are likely to be adverse for equality, inclusion, 
sustainability, and the task of ‘leaving no one behind’. 
 
Conceptions of civil society in development have generally revolved around the roles of 
NGOs in delivering services and in preventing corruption or abuse, often under assumptions 
about such relationships in stable democratic systems with strong legal institutions and a 
free media. Civil society actors in developing country contexts continue to play a major role 
in ‘technical’ and service-delivery roles in which many strive to remain independent from 
politics, in particular partisan competition. However, civil society action in developing 
countries is also frequently political in nature, mobilising disempowered groups and building 
networks and coalitions. An alternative view is of civic space as an arena of constant 
contestation over the distribution of the costs and benefits of development - for whom, where 
and what, how much and how – as well as who should bear them, and how. To understand 
how civic space shapes development outcomes, but also to help explain the wave of political 
elite backlash against civil society, it is important to recognise that civic space encompasses 
both the more technical and autonomous and the more political modes of civil society. 
Contestation need not mean conflict, and battles over norms and values may yield political 
alliances that absorb civil society demands, turning them into matters of politics. Civil society 
similarly responds to political opportunities as they arise. For these reasons, the line 
between contestation over development policy and over political power is rarely firm or fixed.  
 
The substantial scale of NGO service delivery means that the contribution of civil society to 
the achievement of targeted outcomes is likely to be an important and particularly direct 
mechanism through which development may be (adversely) affected by new restrictions. 
The literature highlights a wide range of civil society actors with foreign funding or support 
playing significant roles in development processes in the past, exposing excesses and 
abuses, highlighting areas of neglect or lagging progress, arguing for distributive or targeted 
policies, co-producing or complementing public services, particularly in humanitarian 
contexts, and in general holding governments and private sector actors to account for their 
roles in the development process. The end of the Cold War had meant an expansion of 
global civic space, and a rapid rise in the numbers and spread of NGOs, non-profit groups, 
community-based organisations, and other actors in the ‘third sector’ or civil society actors, 
as they came to be known. They played a particularly important role in international aid, 
where NGO service delivery was frequently seen as the ‘magic bullet’ for reaching the poor 
in weak states with limited fiscal space. But at least since the ‘War on Terror’ from the 2000s, 
efforts to curb money laundering for extremist groups had seen an earlier wave of regulatory 
and administrative restrictions on civil society groups in the developed countries of Europe 
and North America. The past decade saw a particularly sudden rise in the numbers of 
countries instituting new, often punitively restrictive laws and regulations on the activities of 
particular groups as described above. 
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Not all the new regulations on civil society are unwelcome. In many contexts, NGOs and 
CSOs had proliferated in response to the opportunities afforded by international aid, and 
without effective regulation, inefficiencies and abuses have occurred. In principle, many new 
regulations offer an opportunity to improve the governance of the sector, and to deepen its 
accountability to the countries in which it works. But in most instances, efforts to close civic 
space are not an administratively Weberian arrangement of civil society regulation, but a 
heavy-handed mixture of demonisation and stigmatisation, selective application of rules and 
restrictions, criminal and civil litigation, as well as violence and impunity for the instigators of 
violence against civic actors and groups. And as noted above, these restrictions on 
champions of democracy and human rights have been counter-balanced by wider latitude 
for, or spaces occupied by, less ‘civil’ groups and actors, as well as the expansion of the far 
less controllable virtual public space. 
 
6.3 Struggles over national sovereignty amid changing geopolitics 
Efforts to restrict some activity in the civic space are clearly efforts to take power away from 
civil society actors in order to grow the power of the state or its allies in business and 
markets. These are reasonably straightforward efforts to concentrate or consolidate power 
by ruling elites, who perceive in greater control over civil society actors either a reduced 
threat or a promising opportunity. These efforts have been found across a range of types of 
political power regime or settlement, and across countries both developed and developing, 
and it is not clear that closures of civic space are confined to any particular political context. 
What many of the contexts which we examined more closely shared was a context of rapid 
changes in the distribution of political power, either as a dominant political elite was facing 
credible challengers or because of wider processes of democratisation or power-sharing. 
Efforts to concentrate or consolidate power over civil society came in the form of efforts to 
expel or silence some actors, and to co-opt or ensure a closer alignment of civil with political 
society on the needs of development - a tighter ‘fit’, in fact.  
 
These are overtly struggles over power, but to what end? It is clear that to some extent these 
closures expressed an impulse for national sovereignty, framed in part over imported 
‘Western values’ about gender relations and sexuality, freedoms of speech and expression, 
or environmental protections. Each of these efforts to restrict civil society actors emerges out 
of a specifically national and often nationalistic politics of development, and in relation to 
domestic political struggles. But the changing geopolitical setting has also been an important 
driver in several national settings: the influence of China as a major development partner on 
the normative landscape of development practice cannot be understated, even if we still 
know little about it. It is clear, however, that adhering to irksome Western liberal values and 
human rights is of less importance than in the past, and such actors may indeed counteract 
efforts to attract Chinese investment.  
 
6.4 Civic space as ‘fit’ 
In relation to the implications for development, it helps to think of civic space in terms of ‘fit’ it 
affords between state, civil society and market actors in the development process. It is not 
so much the freedom with which freely civil society can operate that makes a difference, as 
whether it is able to use that freedom to engage with and hold state, political and economic 
actors to account for inclusive development policies (whether in process or outcome). This 
means the need for civil society to get close enough to powerholders to be able to influence 
change for its constituents or the greater public good; it also implies the need for distance 
and autonomy, for civil society actors to be able to provide independent scrutiny, critique, 
dissent, and policy alternatives. 
 
Attention to the ‘fit’ between actors within the civic space allows us a more dynamic 
approach to understanding changing relations between state and civil society actors. It helps 
draw attention to the fact that civic space is best understood to be changing rather than 
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shrinking; although international aid donors have historically adopted a narrow definition of 
civil society, there are many different aspects to civil society in most places, and in key 
respects, the space for civic engagement has widened, and the actors diversified. The idea 
of ‘fit’ also draws attention to the fact that changes in the space for civil society are struggles 
for political power. 
 
6.5 Further research 
This paper briefly summarised some of the findings from desk-based analysis which 
attempted to test and refine the propositions in selected countries, as set out above. These 
findings have provided the basis for in-country case study analysis of how changes in civic 
space is shaping development outcomes in particular sectors, and for specific areas of 
development, in particular ‘frontline’ outcomes to do with human development such as 
poverty, hunger and food security, and gender equality. The findings of those case studies 
will be discussed in detail in a forthcoming Working Paper in this series. However, some 
highlights and initial conclusions are worth sharing, in order to focus attention on the need 
for further research in this area. These findings include the significance of geo-political 
change, in particular the rise in importance of China as a development partner, for the 
normative and policy environments within which development policy is formulated. Countries 
in which civic space has narrowed span regime types and levels of development. Many were 
visibly facing a fairly rapid, significant shift in political power, as political elites responded to 
pressures to redistribute or concentrate political power further, from fear of losing power, or 
because of new opportunities to expand state or political capacities. Where civil society was 
seen as an obstacle to such projects, restrictions of a variety of forms resulted. It is notable 
that two of the six countries selected for our country case studies, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe, 
saw a change in the top political leadership during the period of our study, bringing what 
many informed observers saw as potential for change in both the civic space and the 
national development project. 
 
A second finding has related to countries where weak civic and political institutions were 
coupled with a predatory hold on the development process. In several, humanitarian and 
economic crises, resulting from climate change, macroeconomic mismanagement, land-
grabbing, commodity price shocks, corruption scandals, or sanctions, provide particularly 
strong examples of how a poor fit between civil society and state is implicated in the 
production of development disasters and reversals. Human rights activists are under 
particular pressure in these countries. Countries with established civic and political 
institutions, or where efforts, to democratise are under way indicate a tendency to draw civil 
society actors closer into the fold of political power, ensuring progressive actors more 
traction, but leading also to an at times uncomfortably close relationship with the state or 
political actors, which inhibits independent or non-partisan policy engagement. Civic space in 
even fairly established democracies can come under pressure from particularly powerful 
alliances between political and economic actors, particularly in the case of land and natural 
resource deals. In so-called ‘developmental’ states, closing civic space is particularly likely to 
impact on the aid dependent low-income countries through a loss of aid funding to NGO 
service providers. The ‘watchdog’ role of civil society in such contexts remains important 
however, particularly in relation to the credibility of official development performance data, 
which is an important source of legitimacy for political elites in such contexts.  
 
Future research into the implications of closing civic space for development will need to 
engage with these as national political struggles, but ones in which the role of transnational 
actors and geopolitics can be both prominent and problematic. International aid donors, and 
in particular their histories of supporting civil society, often feature centrally in these political 
struggles; however, in the analyses they undertake or fund, aid donors are rarely themselves 
included within the cast of characters involved in such contentions. A stronger assertion of 
national sovereignty over the development process may be expected to accompany a 
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decline in aid dependence. International aid donors would benefit from an improved 
understanding of public and politicians’ perceptions of their roles in contentions over civic 
space and development. Changing geopolitics and the growing importance of China in the 
policy and normative environment also warrant further research. An understanding of the 
prospective impacts on development of closing civic space would profit in particular from an 
understanding of how Chinese aid and development actors view the roles of civil society in 
developing countries, and whether or the extent to which China’s controls on domestic civic 
space are being exported alongside its investments in infrastructure.  
 
A narrow, predominantly liberal and human rights-based understanding of civil society in 
development has pushed out of view actors and activities that do not fit this model. While a 
growing body of research explores the governance and political implications of digital public 
space in developing countries, other newer occupants of the civic space have received far 
less attention in developing countries to date. This includes ‘uncivil’ (rightwing or extremist) 
groups seeking to reverse progress on gender equality and the empowerment of women and 
religious, ethnic or sexual minority groups, and ‘unruly’ protest movements and actors. It is 
clear that such actors play a significant and new, or resurgent, role in shaping development 
policy through their occupation of the civic space. Without understanding the interactions 
between the range of actors in the civic space, ‘civil’ and otherwise, the full impact of the 
current wave of restrictions on civil society cannot be fully grasped.  
 
Further research is indicated in four key areas: 
 
1. Closing civic space as struggles over national sovereignty in the development process 
 
This global wave of closures of liberal civic space is part of distinctly domestic power 
struggles that need to be analysed within their national political context. These struggles are, 
among other things, about setting boundaries for civil society action, and preventing what is 
perceived as its intrusion into the domains of both economic interests – notably, deals over 
land, labour, energy or natural resources – and of politics proper. Political elites may well 
learn from the rulers of other countries and across countries, struggles over civic space are 
of a pattern. But in each instance, the need for civic space closures is domesticated to reflect 
specific local and nationalistic concerns, while asserting national sovereignty against the 
international system. Research should analyse the specific political and economic 
contentions behind superficially similar struggles over civic space to make sense of their 
implications for development in each setting. 
 
2. The rise of China as a development model 
 
From the perspective of national political elites, the development landscape has been 
transformed with the rapid growth in importance of Chinese investment. Perhaps particularly 
for fast-growing countries decreasingly eligible for concessional ODA, but also more widely, 
the emergence of China as a core development partner has meant a relative decline in the 
importance of the West with its liberal values of human rights, democracy, and civil society. 
The national struggles over power that restrict civic political space (noted above) are closely 
influenced by the material interests involved in both the new and the old development 
partnerships, but also, it seems, by the normative environment within which they are formed. 
Given the framing role of the Chinese development model, it would be valuable to research 
the understandings of civil society in the Chinese development model. Public service 
delivery in China itself has grown to depend on local cooperation between state and what 
can reasonably be termed civic actors, in ‘a strategic idea of civil society development’ 
(Teets 2013: 20). Whether such learning has been exported alongside the Chinese ‘big 
development’ model would be a valuable piece of knowledge, as well as an entry point for 
further dialogue about civil society and development beyond the confines of liberal 
democratic values. The retreat of liberal democratic values in Western politics must also be 
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recognised as shaping the normative environment within which civic space has closed in 
developing countries. 
 
3. Occupations and expansions of the civic space 
 
The last decade saw new entrants with disruptive repertoires or illiberal values occupy civic 
space in countries around the world. ‘Unruly’ protestors against austerity or economic 
shocks and ‘uncivil’ groups attacking human rights with patriarchal or inegalitarian values 
have often found new space in the virtual or online public sphere. In countries with strong 
social ties but limited literacy, digital or otherwise, the civic space may become particularly 
volatile and contentious. Development thought and practice has paid insufficient attention to 
these other actors and repertoires in national civic space, despite their potentially powerful 
influence on development policy choices and strategies. Research should examine whether 
and the extent to which these alternative civic actors promote inclusive development, holding 
political and economic actors, and indeed each other, to account. 
 
4. Closing civic space, dispossession and development 
 
A recurrent feature of closing space for civil society in the past few years has been 
contentions over major land and natural resource deals, often around energy and agricultural 
investments, as well as around workers’ rights. Research can help to uncover how and the 
extent to which discourses of national sovereignty and foreign values are underpinned by 
powerful material interests, in documented instances arrayed forcefully against the 
defenders of human rights, social justice, or planetary sustainability. 
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